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President Obama has made it clear that
reforming the American health care system will be
one of his top priorities. In response, congression-
al leaders have promised to introduce legislation
by this summer, and they hope for an initial vote
in the Senate before the Labor Day recess. 
While the Obama administration has not, and
does not seem likely to, put forward a specific re-
form plan, it is possible to discern the key compo-
nents of any plan likely to emerge from Congress: 
• At a time of rising unemployment, the gov-
ernment would raise the cost of hiring work-
ers by requiring employers to provide health
insurance to their workers or pay a fee (tax)
to subsidize government coverage. 
• Every American would be required to buy an
insurance policy that meets certain govern-
ment requirements. Even individuals who
are currently insured—and happy with their
insurance—will have to switch to insurance
that meets the government’s definition of
“acceptable insurance.”
•A government-run plan similar to Medicare
would be set up in competition with private
insurance, with people able to choose either pri-
vate insurance or the taxpayer-subsidized pub-
lic plan. Subsidies and cost-shifting would en-
courage Americans to shift to the government
plan.
•The government would undertake compara-
tive-effectiveness research and cost-effective-
ness research, and use the results of that
research to impose practice guidelines on
providers—initially, in government programs
such as Medicare and Medicaid, but possibly
eventually extending such rationing to pri-
vate insurance plans. 
• Private insurance would face a host of new
regulations, including a requirement to in-
sure all applicants and a prohibition on pric-
ing premiums on the basis of risk. 
• Subsidies would be available to help middle-
income people purchase insurance, while
government programs such as Medicare and
Medicaid would be expanded. 
• Finally, the government would subsidize
and manage the development of a national
system of electronic medical records.
Taken individually, each of these proposals
would be a bad idea. Taken collectively, they would
dramatically transform the American health care
system in a way that would harm taxpayers, health
care providers, and—most importantly—the quali-
ty and range of care given to patients.
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Introduction
President Obama has made it clear that
reforming the American health care system will
be one of his top priorities. Administration
officials have repeatedly referred to health care
reform as Obama’s “top fiscal priority” and
called the need to restrain the growth in health
care costs “the single most important thing we
can do to improve the long-term fiscal health
of our nation.”1 In his first address to Con-
gress, President Obama said, “Health care re-
form cannot wait, it must not wait, and it will
not wait another year.”2 And at a February
2009 White House Summit on health care re-
form that included many of the congressional
and industry stakeholders, President Obama
insisted that health care reform must be passed
“this year.”3 Obama’s proposed 2009 budget
included $634 billion as a “down payment” to
pay for health care reform, although it con-
tains no details about how that money would
be spent.4
In response, congressional leaders have
promised to introduce legislation by this
summer, and they hope for an initial vote in
the Senate before the Labor Day recess.5
President Obama apparently does not plan
to put forward a specific plan for reform.
Rather, the Obama administration is offering
general guidance and direction, while leaving
the details up to Congress. As Obama’s budget
director, Peter Orszag, told a congressional
committee, “On exactly what the administra-
tion does and does not favor on the benefits
and coverage side, you should not expect and
you will not be receiving definitive answers
from me.”6
This strategy stems from the belief of many
administration analysts that one reason for
the failure of President Clinton’s attempt at
health care reform was that the Clinton
administration developed a specific plan in
secret, without congressional input, then
attempted to force Congress to accept it. As
President Obama told ABC News, “They went
behind closed doors and tried to come up with
a plan all by themselves.”7
Still it is possible to discern the outlines of
what a health care reform proposal acceptable
to the White House will look like. President
Obama outlined his ideas in considerable
detail during the campaign. His first choice for
secretary of health and human services, former
South Dakota senator Tom Daschle, wrote a
book on health care reform last year.8 While
Daschle’s nomination had to be withdrawn
due to his failure to pay income taxes, his coau-
thor, Jeanne Lambrew, remains as deputy
director of the White House Office of Health
Reform, ensuring that Daschle’s views remain
prominent. And Obama’s second choice for
secretary of Health and Human Services,
Kathleen Sebelius, pushed several health initia-
tives during her time as governor of Kansas.9
In Congress, Sen. Max Baucus (D-MT),
chairman of the Senate Finance Committee,
has released the outlines of a proposal.10 Since
any health care legislation will have to pass
through his committee, Baucus will help shape
any final bill. Baucus has been working closely
with Sen. Edward Kennedy (D-MA), who sees
health care reform as his final legacy.11 Senator
Kennedy has been meeting with industry
stakeholders and is preparing to draft legisla-
tion. While the meetings have been held in
secret, some conceptual outlines have leaked
out.12 In addition, a bipartisan bill, sponsored
by Sens. Ron Wyden (D-OR) and Robert
Bennett (R-UT), has drawn White House atten-
tion.13
And finally, the $1.3 trillion stimulus bill,
officially known as the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act, contained a number of pro-
visions laying the groundwork for President
Obama’s vision of health care reform.14
If one looks at these various proposals,
outlines, and statements, the broad parame-
ters of the final proposal begin to emerge. It
would not initially create a government-run,
single-payer system such as in Canada or
Britain. Private insurance would still exist, at
least for a time, but it would be reduced to lit-
tle more than a public utility, operating
much like, for example, the electric company,
with the government regulating and control-
ling every aspect of its operation. 
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Coverage would be mandated, both for
employers and individuals. A government-run
plan, similar to Medicare, would be set up in
competition with private insurers. People
could choose either private insurance or the
public plan. The government would under-
take comparative-effectiveness and cost-effec-
tiveness research, and use the results of that
research to impose practice guidelines on
providers—initially in government programs
such as Medicare and Medicaid, but possibly
eventually extending such rationing to private
insurance plans. Private insurance would face
a host of new regulations, including a require-
ment to insure all applicants and a prohibi-
tion on pricing premiums on the basis of risk.
Subsidies would be available to help low- and
(most likely) middle-income people purchase
insurance. And the government would subsi-
dize and manage the development of a nation-
al system of electronic medical records. 
The net result would be an unprecedented
level of government control over one-sixth of
the U.S. economy and some of the most impor-
tant, personal, and private decisions that
Americans make. This approach sets the stage
for the eventual evolution into a single-payer
system. The result would be disastrous for
American taxpayers, the health care industry,
and most importantly, health care consumers.
Let us look at some of the likely provi-
sions of a health care reform plan in more
detail.
An Employer Mandate
As a candidate, Barack Obama said he
would require all employers to provide their
workers with insurance through a “play or
pay” mandate. Employers who do not provide
“meaningful coverage” for their workers
would be required to pay a penalty equal to
some percentage of their payroll into a nation-
al fund that would provide insurance to those
uncovered workers.15
This is an idea that will almost certainly find
favor with congressional Democrats. Senator
Baucus, for example, has endorsed such an
approach, using a sliding scale for the required
contribution with small and mid-sized compa-
nies paying less than large firms.16 And Senator
Kennedy has long supported an employer man-
date. In the House, the chairmen of the three
most relevant committees—Charles Rangel (D-
NY) of the Ways and Means Committee, Henry
Waxman (D-CA) of the Energy and Commerce
Committee, and George Miller (D-CA) of the
Education and Labor Committee—are all back-
ers of an employer mandate.17
It is easy to understand why reformers
would consider an employer mandate. Health
insurance through their employers is already
the way that roughly 70 percent of Americans
under the age of 65 get their health insurance,
which makes it an obvious platform on which
to build.18 In addition, large group purchasers,
such as employers, enjoy economies of scale
that may reduce average administrative costs.
However, there are several problems with
an employer mandate. First, such a mandate is
simply a disguised tax on employment. As
Princeton University professor Uwe Reinhardt
(the “dean of health care economists”) points
out, “[Just because] the fiscal flows triggered
by mandate would not flow directly through
the public budgets does not detract from the
measure’s status of a bona fide tax.”19
And although it might be politically appeal-
ing to claim that business will bear the new tax
burden, nearly all economists see it quite dif-
ferently. The amount of compensation that a
worker receives is a function of his or her pro-
ductivity. The employer is generally indifferent
to the composition of that compensation: it
can be in the form of wages, benefits, or taxes.
What really matters is the total cost of hiring
that worker. Mandating an increase in the cost
of hiring a worker by adding a new payroll tax
does nothing to increase that worker’s produc-
tivity. Employers will therefore seek ways to off-
set the added costs by: raising prices (the most
unlikely solution in a competitive market);
lowering wages; reducing future wage increas-
es; reducing other benefits (such as pensions);
cutting back on hiring; laying off current work-
ers; shifting workers from full-time to part-
time; or outsourcing. 
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Economists are divided about the most
likely way that the cost of an employer man-
date would be passed along to employees.
Some suggest that most of the mandate’s cost
would be offset through lower wages. A study
by Jonathan Gruber, for example, which looks
at the impact of a requirement that health
insurance cover comprehensive childbirth
benefits found strong evidence that employers
reduced wages to pay for the benefits.20 And
Alan Krueger and Uwe Reinhardt suggest that
in the long run, the cost of the employer man-
date would be shifted to the employee not
through immediate wage cuts but through
smaller future wage increases than would oth-
erwise occur.21
On the other hand, a large group of econo-
mists believe that most of the offset costs would
come in the form of job loss. They argue that
workers are likely to resist current wage reduc-
tions, particularly if they value wage compensa-
tion over heath insurance, which seems likely
for many of the currently uninsured.22 In addi-
tion, minimum wage laws provide a floor for
how far employers could reduce wages. As Larry
Summers, now head of the White House’s
National Economic Council, once wrote, the
minimum wage means that “wages cannot fall
to offset employers’ cost of providing a man-
dated benefit, so it is likely to create unemploy-
ment.”23
Mark Pauly of the Wharton School sug-
gests that mandated employer health bene-
fits are particularly pernicious because the
cost of paying premiums is likely to rise over
time, building in a de facto cost of living esca-
lator, and the cost of benefits is also likely to
rise as employees age and have families with
higher health care expenses. Thus the elastic-
ity of employment, or increase in unemploy-
ment, would likely be higher with regard to
mandated health insurance than with some
other mandated benefits, such as an increase
in minimum wage.24
Moreover, not all of those who would be
covered under an employer mandate were
previously uninsured. To cite just one exam-
ple, they might currently be covered under a
spouse’s policy. The mandate would also fall
on firms that were providing insurance, but
whose employer contribution fell below the
minimum required amount, or who provid-
ed benefits that differed from the minimum
benefit package specified by the government.
For instance, high-deductible policies or
health savings accounts might be prohibited.
And it is not just the direct cost of insurance
that would be imposed on employers: busi-
ness would also incur significant administra-
tive costs.25
Low-skilled and low-wage workers would be
particularly at risk. Roughly 43 percent of unin-
sured workers are working within three dollars
of the minimum wage. The mandated insur-
ance costs will represent a proportionately sig-
nificant increase in the cost of employing those
workers. At the same time, since their wages are
already low, and those workers receive few oth-
er employment benefits, employers’ ability to
shift costs will be constrained. The most likely
outcome will be greater unemployment for
workers whose lack of skills does not justify the
increased cost. Economists Katherine Baicker
of Harvard and Helen Levy of the University of
Michigan estimate that a nationwide employer
health insurance mandate would result in the
loss of approximately 315,000 low-skill jobs.26
Others put the number of potential job
losses much higher. In a study for the National
Federation of Independent Business, Michael
Chow and Bruce Phillips estimate that as
many as 1.6 million jobs could be lost in the
first five years after an employer mandate was
imposed, of which two-thirds would be from
small businesses with fewer than 500 employ-
ees. Of those small businesses, 55 percent are
companies with fewer than 100 employees,
and 28.9 percent are companies with just 20
employees or fewer.27 An analysis of a pro-
posed employer mandate for California busi-
nesses suggested a potential job loss in that
state alone of more than 70,000.28 Projecting
that estimate nationwide would mean a loss of
630,000 jobs. 
Limiting the mandate to large firms would
undoubtedly reduce the harm but would also
reduce the mandate’s effectiveness. Congres-
sional Budget Office estimates that a mandate
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limited to large companies would increase the
number of insured Americans by only about
300,000 people.29 Therefore, any mandate is
likely to include “all but the smallest business-
es,” as President Obama said during the cam-
paign.30
A second problem with an employer man-
date is that it would further lock us into our
current employer-based health care system.
Employer-based health insurance is a histori-
cal accident, stemming from a combination
of labor shortages and wage-price controls
initiated during World War II.31 It limits con-
sumer choice by giving decisions over insur-
ance coverage to employers rather than work-
ers. It means that workers who lose their jobs
lose their insurance. 
And it means that individuals who do not
receive employer-provided insurance face an
increased financial burden when they try to
purchase insurance on their own. Indeed, the
New York Times recently pointed out in a story
titled, “When a Job Disappears, So Does the
Health Care,” that the poor economy and ris-
ing unemployment are leading to an increase
in the number of people without insurance:32
According to a study by Georgetown Universi-
ty’s Center for Children and Families, 4.1 mil-
lion people lost their employer-sponsored
health insurance in 2008.33
We should be moving away from an em-
ployment-based system toward one where
workers have personal and portable insurance
that is not linked to their employer’s prefer-
ence or their employment status. Therefore,
an employer mandate would actually repre-
sent a step backwards in terms of a more effec-
tive and compassionate health policy.
An Individual Mandate
During the presidential campaign, Barack
Obama opposed a requirement that every
American buy health insurance. Indeed,
Obama’s opposition to an individual mandate
was a principal area of disagreement with
Hillary Clinton during the Democratic pri-
maries.34 However, administration sources are
now indicating that, while President Obama
will not propose such a mandate, he will
accept one if Congress includes it.35
And it is extremely likely that the final bill
will include an individual mandate. Senator
Baucus calls for one, saying that as a matter of
“individual responsibility . . . it will be each
individual’s responsibility to have coverage.”36
In the House, Rangel, Waxman, and Miller
support it, although they prefer to phrase it as
“everyone will participate, and everyone will
benefit.”37 Not surprisingly, the idea of an
individual mandate has been endorsed by sev-
eral key industry groups and stakeholders,
particularly those who stand to benefit most
by such a mandate—health insurers and physi-
cians.38
An individual mandate also has at least
some Republican support. Former Republi-
can presidential candidate Mitt Romney
signed into law the nation’s first—and so far,
only—individual mandate for health insur-
ance when he was governor of Massachu-
setts.39 Former House Speaker Newt Gingrich
also supports an individual mandate.40 An
individual mandate is included in the biparti-
san Wyden-Bennett bill.41 And analysts from
some conservative groups, such as the Heri-
tage Foundation, have endorsed an individual
mandate.42
As is the case with an employer mandate,
an individual mandate is simply a disguised
tax. After all, if the government takes money
directly from person A and gives the money
to person B, everyone would agree that it is a
tax. It is no different if the government man-
dates that person A simply pay the money
directly to person B. At the end of the day,
Person A has less money to spend as he
chooses. 
Advocates of an individual mandate gener-
ally give two reasons for supporting such a
proposal. Neither is without merit, but ulti-
mately both are unpersuasive. The first is to
prevent cost-shifting from the uninsured. As
Senator Baucus points out, when an individ-
ual without health insurance becomes sick or
injured, he or she still receives medical treat-
ment.43 In fact, hospitals have a legal require-
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ment to provide emergency care regardless of
the patient’s ability to pay. Physicians do not
face the same legal requirement, but few are
willing to deny treatment because a patient
lacks insurance. However, such treatment is
not free. The cost is simply shifted to others—
those with insurance, or more often—taxpay-
ers.44 In fact, although Baucus does not put a
dollar amount on such uncompensated care,
others estimate the cost to be as much as $40.7
billion per year, with 85 percent of that cost
borne by federal, state, and local govern-
ments.45
But it is important to keep this cost in per-
spective. The United States currently spends
roughly $2.4 trillion annually on health care.46
By Baucus’s own estimates, uncompensated
care, then, amounts to about 1.7 percent of the
total U.S. health care spending. Other esti-
mates put it slightly higher, at 3–5 percent.47
While that cost should not be casually dis-
missed, neither is it so grave a problem as to
justify the distortions and regulations that
will inevitably flow from an individual man-
date.
Second, advocates argue that bringing all
Americans into the insurance pool would
“ensure that insurance markets function effec-
tively.”48 Those most likely to go without
health insurance are the young and relatively
healthy. For example, although 18-to 24-year-
olds are only 10 percent of the U.S. popula-
tion, they are 21 percent of the long-term
uninsured.49 For these young, healthy individ-
uals, going without health insurance is often a
logical decision. However, this becomes a form
of adverse selection. Removing the young and
healthy from the insurance pool means that
those remaining in the pool will be older and
sicker. This results in higher insurance premi-
ums for those who are insured. 
However, this argument is true only if
there are cross-subsidies in existing pools. If
everyone’s rates are actuarially fair, then
young people’s explicit or implicit premiums
do not result in lower or higher premiums for
anyone else. There are legitimate arguments
about how to best subsidize the needy within
the health care system, but an individual
mandate would be an excessive response to
what is, in essence, an artificial problem.
The most obvious question about an indi-
vidual mandate is how it would be enforced.
The government would need some way to
determine whether Americans are insured or
not and to penalize those who have not com-
plied with the mandate. 
It seems likely that the mandate suggested
by Senator Baucus “would be enforced possi-
bly through the tax system or some other
point of contact between individuals and the
U.S. government.”50 But about 18 million
Americans are not required to file income tax-
es, mostly because their incomes are too low.51
Another 9 million Americans who are required
to file tax returns nonetheless fail to do so.52
That is potentially 27 million Americans who
would not be providing proof of insurance.
Moreover, only about 30 percent of uninsured
Americans have been uninsured for a full year.
In fact, nearly 45 percent will regain insurance
within four months.53 Therefore, many people
who lack health insurance at some point
throughout the year, will in fact be insured at
the time they file their taxes. Presumably, the
“proof of insurance” could include of the
length of time that the person was insured,
but that would raise the complexity of compli-
ance procedures considerably. It would also
increase the incentive to lie.
If the government were able to determine
that someone has not purchased health insur-
ance, what penalty would apply? Presumably,
some sort of tax penalty is the most likely
approach. But that is much easier said than
done. Eugene Steuerle, currently with the Peter-
son Foundation, has noted that the adminis-
trative and enforcement costs of collecting the
penalty would be enormous. The IRS relies
largely on voluntary compliance backed up by a
slow and cumbersome legal process to collect
taxes. And it does not require those with very
small amounts of income to file. Even so, as
noted above, millions of Americans cheat or fail
to file. Collecting a penalty for failure to insure
would be much more difficult. “The [IRS] is
simply incapable of going to millions of house-
holds, many of modest means, and collecting
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significant penalties at the end of the year,”
Steuerle warns.54
Many of those who fail to comply with the
mandate will indeed be low-income Americans.
Of those without health insurance today, nearly
one-quarter have household incomes of less
than $25,000 per year.55 These individuals will
almost certainly lack the resources to pay any
penalty, particularly a lump-sum penalty as-
sessed at year’s end. 
While implementation of an individual
mandate creates a number of practical diffi-
culties, an even more significant issue is that
it represents the first in a series of dominoes
that will inevitably lead to greater govern-
ment control of the health care system.
To implement an insurance mandate, the
government will have to define what sort of
insurance fulfills that mandate. As the CBO
puts it, “An individual mandate . . . would
require people to purchase a specific service
that would have to be heavily regulated by the
federal government.”56 At the very least,
deductible levels and lifetime caps will have to
be specified, and some form of specific mini-
mum benefit package will likely be spelled out.
That means that the often repeated promise
that “if you are happy with your current insur-
ance, you can keep it” is simply untrue.
Millions of Americans who are currently satis-
fied with their coverage will have to give up
that coverage and purchase the insurance that
the government wants them to have, even if
the new insurance is more expensive or covers
benefits that the buyer does not want.
Whatever the initial minimum benefits
package consists of, special interests represent-
ing various health care providers and disease
constituencies can certainly be expected to
lobby for inclusion under any mandated ben-
efits package. To see this in action, one simply
has to look to state mandates for health insur-
ance benefits. The number of laws requiring
that all insurance policies sold in a state pro-
vide coverage for specified diseases, condi-
tions, and providers has been skyrocketing. In
the 1960s there were only a handful of such
mandates, but today there are more than
1,800.57 And when the Clinton administration
proposed a minimum benefits package as part
of its 1993 health care reform plan, provider
lobbying groups spent millions of dollars in
advertising calling for the inclusion of specific
provider groups or coverage of specific condi-
tions. 
Public choice dynamics are such that
providers (who would make money from the
increased demand for their services) and dis-
ease constituencies (whose members naturally
have an urgent desire for coverage of their ill-
ness or condition) will always have a strong
incentive to lobby lawmakers for inclusion
under any minimum benefits package. The
public at large will likely see resisting the small
premium increase caused by any particular
additional benefit as unworthy of a similar
effort. It is a simple case of concentrated bene-
fits and diffuse costs. 
Massachusetts’s experience provides a cau-
tionary tale on both counts. In 2005, Massa-
chusetts became the first—and so far only—
state to mandate that nearly all residents
purchase health insurance as part of a com-
prehensive health care reform plan. Since
then, Massachusetts has significantly reduced
the number of people in the state who lack
health insurance. However, it has not achieved,
nor does it expect to reach, universal coverage.
(The best estimates suggest that more than
200,000 state residents remain uninsured).58
Significantly, roughly 60 percent of newly
insured state residents are receiving subsidized
coverage, suggesting that the increase in insur-
ance coverage has more to do with increased
subsidies than with the mandate.59
The cost of those subsidies in the face of
predictably rising health care costs has led to
program costs that are far higher than origi-
nally predicted (see below). And the mandate
has indeed led to an increase in regulation
and mandated benefits. The state is phasing
in a requirement that all insurance plans cov-
er prescription drugs and has limited both
deductibles and lifetime payout limits. With
the cost of the program rising, the state has
been forced to raise taxes, and it is now con-
sidering imposing caps on insurance premi-
ums.60
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An individual mandate would be an un-
precedented expansion of government power
and intrusion into the lives of every Ameri-
can. While it is unlikely to achieve the desired
goal of universal coverage, it sets the stage for
increased regulation of the health care sys-
tem in a way that will ultimately harm health
care consumers.
The “Public Option”
Perhaps one of the most contentious issues
in health care reform is whether the govern-
ment should establish a government-run
health care plan, similar to Medicare, which
would compete with private insurance. The
inclusion of such a government-run plan has
become a line in the sand for many liberal
health care reformers, especially those who
would actually prefer a single-payer system. 
When, at the White House Summit on
Health Care Reform, Sen. Charles Grassley (R-
IA) asked President Obama whether he still
supported such a proposal, the president said
that he was “not going to respond definitively.”
But he then went on to note that “the thinking
on the public option is that it gives consumers
more choices and it helps . . . keep the private
sector honest, because there’s competition out
there.”61 House speaker Nancy Pelosi insists
that a government-run plan be part of any final
reform package.62 Senator Baucus is also on
the record supporting such a “public option.”63
And at her nomination hearing, HHS Sec-
retary Kathleen Sebelius called for “a public
option, side-by-side with private insurers.”64
What exactly such a “public option” would
be remains unsettled. Some proponents envi-
sion an expansion of the current Medicare pro-
gram to those younger than 65. Others argue
that an entirely new government program
should be created, while still others would
allow a buy-in to the Federal Employee Health
Benefit Program. The program might be
administered directly by the government, or
claims management and other functions
might be bid out to private insurers on a con-
tractual basis.
Regardless of how it was structured or ad-
ministered, such a government-run plan would
have an inherent advantage in the marketplace
because it would ultimately be subsidized by
American taxpayers. The government plan
could, for instance, keep its premiums artificial-
ly low or offer extra benefits since it can turn to
the U.S. Treasury to cover any shortfalls. Con-
sumers would naturally be attracted to the low-
er-cost, higher-benefit government program,
which would undercut the private market. 
A government program would also have an
advantage since its enormous market presence
would allow it to impose much lower reim-
bursement rates on doctors and hospitals.65
Government plans such as Medicare and
Medicaid traditionally reimburse providers at
rates considerably below those of private
insurance. Providers recoup the lost income by
shifting costs onto those with private insur-
ance. Indeed, it is estimated that privately
insured patients pay $89 billion annually in
additional insurance costs because of cost-
shifting from government programs.66 If one
assumes that the new public option would
have similar reimbursement policies, it would
result in additional cost-shifting as much as
$36.4 billion annually. Such cost-shifting
would force insurers to raise their premiums,
making them even less competitive with the
taxpayer-subsidized public plan. The result
would be a death spiral for private insurance.
Medicaid provides a useful example of how
public programs “crowd out” private coverage.
As income eligibility levels for Medicaid are
raised, many of the newly eligible are already cov-
ered by employer-provided or individually pur-
chased insurance. Many of these individuals
shift from the private to the public systems. In
fact, a Robert Wood Johnson Foundation sur-
vey of 22 studies of the relationship between
government insurance programs and private
coverage concluded that substitution of govern-
ment for private coverage “seems inevitable.”67
And the CBO estimates that between one-third
and one-half of children who were be added to
the State Children’s Health Insurance Program
under its recent expansion were already covered
by private health insurance.68
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Companies, in particular, would have an
incentive to try to shift workers into the pub-
lic market. Even with an employer-mandate in
place, companies could do so by maximizing
employee contributions or moving to plans
that restrict employee options. And if, as the
Obama administration has discussed, limits
are placed on the deductibility of employer-
provided health insurance,69 there will be an
even greater incentive for companies to dump
workers into the public plan.70 That means
tens of millions of workers who would rather
stay with their current job-based plan would
no longer have that as a choice. They would
effectively be forced into the government plan.
The actuarial firm Lewin Associates esti-
mates that, depending on how premiums,
benefits, reimbursement rates, and subsidies
were structured, as many as 118.5 million peo-
ple would shift from private to public cover-
age.71 That would mean a nearly 60 percent
reduction in the number of Americans with
private insurance.72
Some advocates of the public option com-
pare it to states where the state government
self-insures its state employee health plan, or
an option under that plan.73 However, in those
cases, the state is simply assuming the financial
risk of insurance in the same way that most
large employers do. Roughly 89 percent of
companies with more than 5,000 employees
self-insure.74 The self-insured state plans are
administered by private insurers and, unlike
existing federal government health plans, oper-
ate under the same rules as private insurance.
As Paul Ginsberg, president of the Center for
Studying Health System Change explains, “Al-
though they specify the benefit structure and
whether there should be disease management
or wellness programs, they are basically buying
into provider networks that the insurer has
developed for all of its enrollees.”75
It is virtually inconceivable that the new
federal public option would operate under
identical rules as private insurance. If that were
the case, there would be no point to having
such an option. Indeed, the biggest reason
that advocates support such a plan is that it
can use its monopsony purchasing power to
demand or impose reduced reimbursement
rates. “A public plan is capable of using its con-
centrated purchasing power to reduce costs,”
states a new study by Jacob Hacker for the
Institute for America’s Future.76
Moreover, how long could a Congress that
is busy bailing out banks and automobile
companies because they are “too big to fail”
resist subsidizing the government’s insur-
ance plan if it began to lose money? Could a
Congress that has been unable to control the
unsustainable cost of Medicare set and keep
premiums at market levels? It seems unlikely.
Whatever rules the public plan started
with, they would soon be changed to ensure its
advantage over private insurance. Indeed, to
gauge the attitude that public option support-
ers have toward private sector competition, we
need look no farther than Medicare Advan-
tage.77Democrats have raged against competi-
tion from those private plans, and President
Obama has even suggested eliminating Medi-
care Advantage outright.78 Most congression-
al Democrats also strongly opposed the inclu-
sion of private insurance plans under the
Medicare prescription drug benefit.
Given that many of the most outspoken
advocates of the “public option” have, in the
past, supported a government-run single-pay-
er system, it is reasonable to assume that they
support a public option precisely because it
would squeeze out private insurance and even-
tually lead to a government-run single-payer
system. President Obama himself has said that
if he were designing a health care system from
scratch, his preference would be for a single-
payer system “managed like Canada’s.”79 And
he has suggested that, while he has proposed a
less radical approach, “it may be that we end
up transitioning to such a system.”80
In this context, it is notable that congres-
sional Democrats are also proposing to
expand existing government programs. For
example, leading Democratic proposals
would increase eligibility levels for Medicaid
and would eliminate the two-year waiting
period for people with disabilities to become
eligible for Medicare.81 Senator Baucus has
also suggested that individuals between ages
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55 and 65 should be able to “buy in” to
Medicare.82 Thus, private insurance would
find itself squeezed by competition from the
bottom (Medicaid), top (Medicare), and sides
(the government option) at the same time
that it is being subjected to heavy new regu-
lation and costs are being increasingly shift-
ed from public to private programs. It is
unlikely that any significant private insur-
ance market could continue to exist under
such circumstances. America would be firm-
ly on the road to a single-payer health care
system with all the dangers that presents.
Government Playing Doctor
Buried in the giant $1.3 trillion stimulus
bill was a provision authorizing $1.1 billion
for the federal Agency for Healthcare Research
and Quality to conduct a “comparative-effec-
tiveness research program.”83 The bill also cre-
ated a Federal Coordinating Council for
Comparative Effectiveness Research, to coor-
dinate comparative-effectiveness research
throughout various federal departments and
agencies.84 These provisions, seemingly incon-
sequential in themselves, represent the first
building blocks in what is almost certain to be
a key component of any comprehensive health
care reform proposal. 
Many health care reform advocates believe
that much of U.S. health care spending is
wasteful or unnecessary. Certainly it is impos-
sible to draw any sort of direct correlation
between the amount of health care spending
and outcomes.85 In fact, by some estimates as
much as 30 percent of all U.S. health spending
produces no discernable value.86 Medicare
spending, for instance, varies wildly from
region to region, without any evidence that
the variation is reflected in the health of
patients or procedural outcomes.87 The CBO
suggests that we could save as much as $700
billion annually if we could avoid treatments
that do not result in the best outcomes.88
It makes sense, therefore, to test and
develop information on the effectiveness of
various treatments and technology. But there
are a number of problems with having the
government undertake this research.89
First, “quality” and “value” are not unidi-
mensional terms. In fact, such concepts are
highly idiosyncratic with every individual
having different ideas of what quality and
value mean to them, based on such things as
a person’s pain tolerance, lifestyle, feelings
about hospitalization, desire to return to
work, and so forth. For example, a surgeon
may tell you that the only way to ensure a
cure for prostate cancer is a radical prostec-
tomy. But that procedure’s side effects can
severely impact quality of life—so some peo-
ple prefer a procedure with a lower survival
rate but fewer side effects.90 Who is better
suited to determine which of those proce-
dures represents quality and value, a govern-
ment board or the person directly affected? 
Second, comparative-effectiveness research
too often has a tendency to gear its results
toward the “average” patient. But many pa-
tients are outliers, whose response to any par-
ticular treatment, for either good or ill, can
vary significantly from the average. This mat-
ters little when the research is simply informa-
tive. However, if the research becomes the basis
for more prescriptive requirements, for exam-
ple prohibiting reimbursements for some
types of treatment, the impact on patient out-
liers could be severe.
Third, comparative-effectiveness research
can create a time lag for the introduction of
new technologies, drugs, and procedures.
The FDA, for example, has already caused
delays in introducing drugs, which has
resulted in unnecessary deaths.91 Depending
on how the final program is structured, com-
parative-effectiveness research could create
another layer of bureaucracy and testing
between the development of a new drug and
its introduction into the health care system.
One only has to look at the difficulty in
expanding Medicaid drug formularies to see
how this could become a problem. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly,
there is also the question of whether quality
or value includes consideration of the relative
cost of a treatment. Supporters of govern-
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ment-sponsored comparative-effectiveness
research strongly deny that it would ever be
used to ration care simply on the basis of
cost. As Elliott Fisher of Dartmouth Medical
School says, “It’s an absurd mischaracteriza-
tion of effectiveness research to equate it with
cost-benefit analysis.”92
Yet, there is reason to believe that that sort
of cost-benefit analysis is exactly what some
advocates of comparative-effectiveness re-
search and practice guidelines support. For
instance, House Appropriations Committee
chairman David Obey (D-WI) inserted lan-
guage in the report accompanying the origi-
nal House version of the economic stimulus
bill in which he said: 
By knowing what works best and pre-
senting this information more broadly to
patients and health care professionals,
those items, procedures, and interven-
tions that are most effective to prevent,
control, and treat health conditions will
be utilized, while those that are found to
be less effective and in some cases more
expensive, will no longer be prescribed.93
Acting National Institutes of Health
director Raynard Kington told Congress that
the NIH may include comparisons of the cost
of medical treatments in its research.94 Since
the NIH will be conducting much of this
research, that has raised a number of red
flags. And, the Senate voted 44–54 against an
amendment to the budget offered by Sen.
Jon Kyl (R-AZ) that would have prohibited
cost from being considered in comparative-
effectiveness research.95
Even this would not be a major cause for
concern if the government’s goal were simply
to provide information. After all, if a less expen-
sive treatment provided the same results as a
more expensive one, shouldn’t doctors—and
consumers—know about it? However, a much
more serious question arises when the ques-
tion of cost-effectiveness bumps up against
moral or values-based questions, when the pos-
itive nature of science and the normative
nature of value and political systems are mixed.
For example, should there be a presump-
tion that saving the life of a person in danger
of dying automatically takes precedence over
improving the quality of life for someone
whose life is not in immediate danger? What
about immediately saving a real life versus
saving some number of hypothetical future
lives? Or to put it more practically—and
bluntly—what is the value of performing an
expensive procedure such as, say, hip-replace-
ment surgery on an elderly patient who
might only survive for a few more years any-
way? Should we use extraordinary means to
extend the life of a cancer patient by a few
months? 
Such questions are by definition values-
based and cannot be answered through the sci-
entific process. As John Kraemer and Lawrence
Gostin of Georgetown University wrote in a
recent issue of the Journal of the American Medical
Association, when people say that the cost of
treating a condition is too expensive and there-
fore should not be used, they are actually mak-
ing three separate assertions based on a mix of
scientific and values-based claims: 1) the cost
of treatment equals a certain amount (a posi-
tive or scientific claim), 2) treatments costing
more than a certain amount are not cost-effec-
tive (both a positive claim and a normative or
values-based claim), and 3) cost-effectiveness
should be the basis for allocating health care
resources (a normative claim).96
If such questions cannot be answered scien-
tifically, we should then ask whether they
should be made by individuals or by the larger
society through the political process. Advocates
of government rationing explicitly favor the lat-
ter. For example, Knut Erik Tranoy, professor
emeritus at the Centre for Medical Ethics of the
University of Oslo, who is an original member
of Norway’s Health Care Priorities Commis-
sion and a prominent philosophical advocate
of rationing, decries “a health care system where
patients buy services in a market, and where jus-
tice means equality of opportunity to buy what
you need. Decisions about alternative use are
then (largely) patients’ decisions.”97 According
to Tranoy “it is neither medically nor morally
defensible to put scarce resources to uses which
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will foreseeably yield less favorable outcomes
than other uses—save fewer lives, cure fewer
patients.”98
This inevitably leads to the question of
whether comparative-effectiveness research
will simply be used to provide information,
or whether it will be used to impose a gov-
ernment-dictated way to practice medicine.
For those seeking to use comparative-effec-
tiveness research as a means to reduce overall
health care spending, there is a good reason for
making the use of such information the basis
for mandatory practice guidelines. As the CBO
notes, “[T]o affect medical treatment and
reduce health care spending in a meaningful
way, the results of comparative-effectiveness
analyses would not only have to be persua sive
but also would have to be used in ways that
changed the behavior of doctors, other health
professionals, and patients.”99 America’s Health
Insurance Plans estimates that, if implemented
on a purely voluntary basis, comparative-effec-
tiveness research would produce a savings of
only 0.3 percent in national health expendi-
tures over 10 years.100 The CBO estimates that
the voluntary implementation of comparative-
effectiveness research would reduce federal
health spending by a mere “one one-hundredth
of one percent” over the next 10 years.101
Therefore, if there is to be any significant
cost savings, the results of the research would
have to be imposed on a mandatory basis in a
way that proscribes treatments deemed not
cost-effective. Logically, the restrictions would
start with government programs such as
Medicare and Medicaid.102 However, it is note-
worthy that Sen. Daschle has suggested that
Congress should “link the tax exclusion for
health insurance to insurance that complies
with [comparative-effectiveness] recommen-
dations.”103
There is no doubt that national health
care systems in other countries use compara-
tive-effectiveness research as the basis for
rationing. For example, in Great Britain, the
National Institute on Clinical Effectiveness
makes such decisions, including a controver-
sial determination that certain cancer drugs
are “too expensive.”104
It seems unlikely that most Americans are
willing to accept the idea that government
should make decisions about what types of
treatments their doctor can provide. Moreover,
even if such rationing were desirable, there is
no evidence that the government would be able
to make those decisions on a scientific basis. A
government body deciding on the compara-
tive-effectiveness or cost-effectiveness of med-
ical treatments will inevitably base its decisions
as much on politics as on science. As Uwe
Reinhardt warns, government comparative-
effectiveness research would be “vulnerable to
lobbying by interest groups, because one or a
few members of Congress could easily imperil
[the research agency’s] existence through the
appropriations process.”105
Consider Oregon’s attempt to prioritize
Medicaid services. In 1992, Oregon guaranteed
all state residents under the poverty line a basic
level of health care. At the same time, because
funding was limited, the Oregon Health
Services Commission drafted a priority-ranked
list of medical services available to Oregonians.
The state would fund services deemed priority
on the basis of such factors as cost, duration of
a treatment’s benefit, improvement in the
patient’s quality of life, and community values.
Services that did not qualify under these crite-
ria would not be funded.106 However, political
calculations quickly became part of the rank-
ing process, with the program becoming a bat-
tleground for special interests associated with
various disease constituencies and health care
specialties. Groups battled with each other to
make sure that their needs or services were
included in the list of covered services. The list
was repeatedly revised to reflect not the best
medical judgment but outside pressure. The
legislature repeatedly intervened. The U.S.
Office of Technology Assessment concluded
that the Oregon’s prioritization plan “has not
operated as the scientific vessel of rationing
that it was advertised to be. Although initial
rankings were based in large part on mathe-
matical values, controversies around the list
forced administrators to make political conces-
sions and move medical services ‘by hand’ to
satisfy constituency pressures.”107
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At the federal level, agencies like the
Council on Health Technology, Agency for
Health Care Policy and Research, and the
Agency for Health Care Research and Quality
have had their funding cut when their
research conflicted with the desires of power-
ful interest groups.108
The government even interferes with pri-
vate sector attempts to make comparative-
effectiveness decisions when those decisions
impact powerful interest groups or voting
blocks. For example, the Connecticut attorney
general has attacked the Infectious Disease
Society of America for recommending against
the use of long-term antibiotics to treat chron-
ic Lyme disease. Although the IDSA based its
non-binding recommendation on the over-
whelming scientific evidence, the Internation-
al Lyme and Associated Diseases Society, a
well-connected and media-savvy advocacy
group for those with Lyme disease, protested
by taking its case to the Connecticut political
establishment. As a result, Connecticut attor-
ney general Richard Blumenthal sued the
IDSA under the state’s anti-trust laws.109
Already, special-interest groups are maneu-
vering to influence the outcome of compara-
tive-effectiveness research. To cite just one ex-
ample, the Partnership to Improve Patient
Care is funded by groups such as Easter Seals,
Friends of Cancer Research, the Alliance for
Aging Research, the Advanced Medical Tech-
nology Association, and the pharmaceutical
and biotech industry lobbies. It seeks to “refo-
cus” the comparative-research debate to en-
sure that its members’ interests are protect-
ed.110
There is no need for the government to get
involved in comparative-effectiveness research:
the private sector is already heavily involved in
such research. As the CBO has pointed out,
“private health plans—most commonly the
larger or more integrated ones—conduct their
own reviews of evidence and sometimes
undertake new analysis of comparative effec-
tiveness.”111 These companies use the research
to “shape their policies regarding coverage and
payment.”112 Most health plans, for example,
have pharmacy and therapeutic committees
that make recommendations about which
prescription drugs should be covered on the
basis of comparative effectiveness. In addition,
Blue Cross Blue Shield’s Technology Evalu-
ation Center; Hayes, Inc.; the ECRI Institute;
the Tufts–New England Medical Center; the
HMO Research Network; and InfoPOEMs
perform or collect comparative research, and
some even offer the information for sale.113
Universities and medical schools also perform
such research and publish their results.
Therefore, rather than produce new informa-
tion on comparative-effectiveness, a govern-
ment program is likely to simply crowd out
private research that is already occurring. 
To argue against government involvement in
comparative-effectiveness research is not to
argue against comparative-effectiveness research.
Private sector research is occurring and should
continue. Providers should make greater use of
the information provided by such research. But
government-directed research is unlikely to be
effective, and it poses a distinct threat that it will
evolve into government-imposed rationing of
care. In fact, it is liable to yield the worst of all pos-
sible worlds—not only rationing, but rationing
that is based on special-interest lobbying rather
than science. 
In short, the government should not be
substituting its judgment for that of doctors
and patients.
Community Rating/
Guaranteed Issue
It seems almost a certainty that any health
insurance reform plan to emerge from Con-
gress will contain a host of new insurance reg-
ulations. Among the likeliest is a requirement
that insurers accept all applicants regardless of
their health (guaranteed issue), and a stipula-
tion that forbids insurers from basing premi-
ums on risk factors such as health or age
(community rating). 
The regulations would be an attempt to
deal with the problem of preexisting condi-
tions. That is, people today who are unin-
sured, and who are suffering from expensive
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medical conditions, have great difficulty
finding affordable health insurance, if they
can get coverage at all.114 Congress, therefore,
seeks to prohibit the practice of excluding
people with preexisting conditions or charg-
ing them more.
Most big insurance companies, more con-
cerned with other threats, seem willing to go
along, especially if such a requirement were
combined with an individual mandate.115
Nonetheless, imposing community rating
and guaranteed issue would create far more
problems than it would solve.
As the CBO has noted, community rating
and guaranteed issue make it more likely that
people will choose to go without health insur-
ance.116 For example, in the year after New
York imposed community rating in 1993, an
estimated 500,000 people cancelled their
insurance.117 This happens because communi-
ty rating raises premiums for young and
healthy individuals, whereas both community
rating and guaranteed issue reduce or elimi-
nate the penalty for waiting to purchase insur-
ance until a person is older or sicker. As a
result, the young and healthy make the very
logical choice to forgo health insurance,
assuming that they can always purchase insur-
ance later when they need it. It is as if you
could buy retroactive auto insurance after
you’ve had an accident. As the healthy leave
the insurance pool, the proportion of sick in
the pool grows ever greater—leading to higher
premiums which in turn causes the healthiest
remaining individuals to leave in what
amounts to an insurance death spiral. 
Of course, an individual mandate will the-
oretically prevent the young and healthy
from dropping out of the insurance market.
On the other hand, combining community
rating/guaranteed issue with a mandate will
force young healthy individuals to purchase
insurance with much higher premiums than
would otherwise be the case.
In addition, by prohibiting insurers from
pricing care on the basis of risk, community
rating/guaranteed issue creates an incentive to
over-provide care for the healthy, while under-
providing it to the sick. That is because under
community rating, insurance premiums are
based not on the expected cost of caring for a
specific individual, but on the average cost of
care for all patients. Because of the way health
care costs are distributed, most of the insured
under that plan will have actual costs that are
lower than their premiums, while a few will
have costs in excess of their premiums, and
some far in excess (about 5 percent of the pop-
ulation accounts for nearly half of health care
expenses).118
Therefore, for an insurance company to
maximize its profitability, it will seek to do
two things. First, it will want to reduce the cost
of caring for its high-cost sick people, or—bet-
ter yet—induce them to switch to another
plan. The easiest way to do that is not to have
the doctors and facilities sick people want. As
Alain Enthoven has pointed out, “A good way
to avoid enrolling diabetics is to have no
endocrinologists on staff. . . . A good way to
avoid cancer patients is to have a poor oncolo-
gy department.”119
Second, an insurance company will seek
to retain its low-cost healthy customers, and
in fact, it will try to attract more such indi-
viduals. That means doing exactly the oppo-
site of what the insurer does with sick people:
it will offer services that will be attractive to
healthy people, such as cancer screenings,
sports medicine facilities, or even health club
memberships. 
Thus, while guaranteed issue and com-
munity rating may make health insurance
more available and affordable for those with
preexisting conditions, it may well have the
perverse result of lowering the quality of care
that those individuals receive.
Yet there are far less intrusive ways to deal
with the admittedly pressing problem of pro-
viding a way to cover individuals with preex-
isting conditions. Some have suggested great-
er use of state-based high-risk pools. While
imperfect, such proposals would represent a
far less damaging way to cover those with pre-
existing conditions. A new and far more
promising proposal is “health-status insur-
ance,” which provides a lump-sum payment
sufficient to pay the higher premiums that
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insurers charge to those people with preexist-
ing conditions. Health-status insurance covers
the risk of premium reclassification, just as
medical insurance covers the risk of medical
expenses.120
Middle-Class Subsidies
Almost any health care reform plan is
going to contain a certain amount of subsidy
to help low-income individuals obtain cover-
age. After all, the number one reason that
people give for not purchasing insurance is
that they cannot afford it.121 However, if such
subsidies go too far up the income ladder,
they can easily create more problems than
they solve.
Until the actual legislation is finally
unveiled, it is impossible to know just how
extensive the subsidies will be. Yet, recent con-
gressional actions provide cause for concern.
Notably, Congress this year passed an exten-
sion of the State Children’s Health Insurance
Program that made it possible for states to
subsidize families with incomes as high as 400
percent of the poverty level ($83,000 for a fam-
ily of four).122 Indeed, if one considers “income
disregards” that deduct certain expenses such
as mortgage payments, some families with
annual incomes as high as $100,000 could
receive subsidies.123 Democratic congressional
leaders have indicated that they envision a fur-
ther expansion of Medicaid eligibility as part
of any comprehensive health care plan.124
The expansion of subsidies will greatly
increase the number of people dependent on
government, extending government welfare
programs well into the middle class. As with
all means-tested government programs, we
can expect this new middle-class welfare bene-
fit to discourage work, family formation,
wealth accumulation, and self-sufficiency,
while creating a voting constituency that
favors ever-expanding benefits.
And such subsidies are expensive. As part
of its reform plan, Massachusetts agreed to
subsidize families with incomes up to 300 per-
cent of the poverty line ($63,500 for a family of
four). Spending for the Commonwealth Care
subsidized program has doubled, from $630
million in 2007 to an estimated $1.3 billion
for 2009. Despite assessing insurers and hos-
pitals, raising the penalty on noncompliant
businesses, increasing premiums and copay-
ments for consumers, and raising the state
tobacco tax, the program’s financing remains
on an unsustainable course.125
In addition, such subsidies are poorly tar-
geted. Many of those eligible for coverage
already have health insurance. As discussed
above, this crowding-out phenomenon has
been readily apparent with both the tradi-
tional Medicaid and SCHIP programs. 
Therefore, the subsidies should not be seen
just as a method of increasing coverage, but as
a way of shifting a large portion of insurance
costs from individuals to the tax system. It
becomes simply another form of income redis-
tribution. While many taxpayers may accept
such redistribution to the truly poor, how will
they feel about financing transfers to the mid-
dle class?
Government-Directed
Health Information
Technology
One area of health care reform where there
is a broad-based consensus is the need for
increased use of electronic medical records
and other health information technologies. 
Too many medical records are still main-
tained on paper, making it slow and difficult
to pass needed information from physician to
physician. Just 17 percent of U.S. physicians
are currently using electronic medical records
for their patients.126 For hospitals, the num-
bers are even worse—just 9.1 percent have even
a basic system, and just 1.5 percent have a
comprehensive system.127 Where electronic
records do exist, hospital and physician sys-
tems are often incompatible. The unavailabili-
ty and incompatibility of electronic medical
records contributes to the unnecessary deaths
of up to 8,000 people each year because of
medication errors.128
15
The expansion 
of subsidies will
greatly increase
the number of
people dependent
on government.
363592_PA638_1stClass:363592_PA638_1stClass  5/19/2009  12:11 PM  Page 15
In response, the Obama administration
included $19 billion in the stimulus bill for
health information technology. Most of those
funds will be used to subsidize and provide
incentives for doctors and hospitals to move
from paper to electronic recordkeeping.
Beginning in 2011, both the Medicare and
Medicaid programs will provide subsidies to
physicians who adopt “meaningful use” of a
“certified” electronic medical record system.
Those payments could run as high as $18,000
in the first year for those complying in 2011,
with subsidies declining in future years.
Hospitals will be eligible for a one-time $2 mil-
lion payment, plus an increase in their Medi-
care diagnosis-related group fees. However, in
addition to the subsidy carrot, the stimulus bill
also contained a stick. Those physicians who
do not comply by 2015 will lose 1 percent of
their Medicare fees, escalating to 3 percent by
2017. Noncompliant hospitals will have their
DRG-based fees reduced. 
More controversially, the stimulus bill also
included funding to significantly expand and
strengthen the office of the National Coordi-
nator of Health Information Technology, ini-
tially created by the Bush administration, to
coordinate federal efforts to ensure that that
every American has a “certified electronic
health record” by 2014. 
Some conservatives expressed concern
that this provision, combined with the pro-
posals for government-sponsored compara-
tive-effectiveness research, would use such
electronic records to “monitor treatments to
make sure your doctor is doing what the fed-
eral government deems appropriate and cost-
effective,” as Betsy McCaughey, an adjunct
senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, wrote
for Bloomberg.com.129
While such concerns should not be dis-
missed out of hand, it seems more likely that
the goal at this point is simply to make cer-
tain that government has “a seat at the table”
as the private sector develops standards for
electronic medical records, as a spokesman
for the Obama administration has said.130
That alone is reason enough for concern.
The private sector is already mounting an
ambitious effort to develop electronic medical
records. Health care IT spending is expected to
exceed $28.4 billion in 2009, an increase of 6.6
percent over 2008.131 And while the recession
has forced a cutback in most types of IT
spending, health care IT spending is expected
to grow.132 In fact, health care IT spending in
the future is expected to exceed IT spending in
all other industry sectors.133 Google Health
Records Online has led the way, while Micro-
soft has teamed up with Kaiser Permamente
to offer its own electronic medical record soft-
ware.134 Telemedicine companies, like Tela-
Doc, and patient advocacy organizations, like
PinnacleCare, collect and digitize medical
records for their customers.135
On the other hand, the government’s track
record on IT is not particularly inspiring. The
FBI spent four years and $170 million trying to
computerize its case system, only to abandon
the project in 2005. Before that, the Federal
Aviation Administration wasted more than $1
billion on a so-far unsuccessful attempt to
overhaul the air traffic control computer sys-
tem.136
The stimulus bill did not define “meaning-
ful use” or “certified electronic health re-
cords.”137 A restrictive interpretation of these
terms could well stifle private sector innova-
tion. Moreover, imposing a single set of federal
standards on health IT means the entire sys-
tem will be locked in to those standards for
very long time to come and future innovation
will be limited. The federal government is not
noted for its ability to respond rapidly to
changing technology and circumstances. 
Even if successful, there are reasons to
question the administration’s estimates for
the effectiveness of health IT, most notably
projections for how much it can reduce
health care spending. Proponents of govern-
ment spending for health IT generally cite a
RAND Corporation analysis from 2005 that
predicted $77 billion in annual savings and
improved outcomes.138 But the study also
says that level of savings won’t be reached
until 2019. 
Moreover, numerous experts have disput-
ed this estimate. For example, the CBO criti-
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cized the RAND study as an overly opti-
mistic, best-case scenario, and says that sim-
ply adopting electronic medical records “by
itself, is generally not sufficient”to reduce
costs.139
Privacy advocates raise additional con-
cerns about a nationwide network of elec-
tronic medical records, particularly one
developed and monitored by the govern-
ment. If fully implemented, the Obama blue-
print would produce nationwide databases
containing all of a patient’s medical informa-
tion—including illnesses and genetic predis-
positions, alcohol and drug addiction, and
medication—all attached to personal identi-
fiers like Social Security numbers. The lan-
guage in the stimulus bill appears to have sig-
nificantly eroded patient privacy protections,
allowing personal health data to be sold for
public or private purposes.140 The govern-
ment has further always maintained that law
enforcement must have access to otherwise
private medical data.141
Even without deliberate government
action, there are threats to patient privacy and
the security of electronic medical records. As
Robert Bazell of NBC recently reported, “There
have been privacy breaches already: hackers
getting into hospital systems, doctors losing
laptops, and medical staff looking at records
they don’t need to see.”142 The government, in
particular, has had several notorious privacy
breeches, such as the theft of a Veterans
Administration laptop (which contained per-
sonal data, including Social Security numbers)
and the National Institute of Health’s loss of a
laptop (which contained sensitive medical
information on 2,500 patients enrolled in NIH
studies).143
Such privacy breaches are probably un-
avoidable as health records naturally migrate
to online formats. But a single nationwide net-
work under government supervision would
magnify the danger. 
As with comparative-effectiveness research,
health IT is desirable because it is something
that could ultimately improve health care and
reduce costs. However, just because something
is worth doing does not mean, therefore, that
the government should do it. The private sec-
tor is already making strides in developing
effective electronic medical records. Increased
government involvement threatens to slow
down this progress, creats new dangers for
patient privacy, and potentially threatens both
patient and physician choice.
A Brief Word about Cost
No one knows how much the final health
care reform plan will cost. As mentioned
above, the Obama administration’s proposed
2009 budget sets aside $634 billion as a con-
tingency “down payment.” Other estimates
put the total costs in the range of $1.5–1.7
trillion over a 10-year period.144
However, cost estimates for government
programs have been wildly optimistic over
the years, especially for health care programs.
For example, when Medicare was instituted
in 1965, it was estimated that the cost of
Medicare Part A would be $9 billion by 1990.
In actuality, it was seven times higher—$67
billion.145 Similarly, in 1987, Medicaid’s spe-
cial hospitals subsidy was projected to cost
$100 million annually by 1992 (just five years
later); however, it actually cost $11 billion—
more than 100 times as much.146 And in
1988, when Medicare’s home care benefit was
established, the projected cost for 1993 was
$4 billion, but the actual cost was $10 bil-
lion.147 If the current estimates for the cost of
Obamacare are off by similar orders of mag-
nitude, we would be enacting a new entitle-
ment that could bury future generations
under mountains of debt and taxes.
The administration has raised a number of
ideas for how to pay for the program. Their
budget would fund the $634 billion down
payment through a number of measures,
including reducing payments to private insur-
ers under the Medicare Advantage Program;
reducing the rate at which taxpayers with over
$250,000 in annual income can itemize tax
deductions; and a number of smaller propos-
als to increase efficiency and reduce waste.148
However, these proposals were stripped out of
17
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the budget resolution that was approved by
Congress. Reform supporters must now look
for other funding mechanisms. For example,
Sen. Kent Conrad (D-ND), chairman of the
Senate Budget Committee, has suggested that
he is open to “energy taxes” as a way to pay for
health care reform.149 However, such measures
will fall far short of what is necessary to pay for
the full costs of the reform plan. It will be nec-
essary therefore to either run up more nation-
al debt—at a time when massive future budget
deficits threaten to bankrupt the country—or
to break President Obama’s pledge not to raise
taxes on the middle class.150
As humorist P. J. O’Rourke once said, “If
you think health care is expensive now, wait
until you see what it costs when it's free.”151
Conclusion
It is likely that Congress will vote on a
health care reform bill before the end of the
year.152 While the details of that bill have not
yet been revealed, its broad outlines are readily
apparent from the campaign promises and
more recent statements of President Obama,
the writings and statements of the Obama
administration’s health care advisers, and pro-
posals by the congressional Democrats who
have been leading the administration’s efforts
on Capitol Hill. 
Unfortunately, it appears that the final pro-
posal will be a cornucopia of bad policy ideas. It
would impose an unprecedented level of gov-
ernment control over one-sixth of the U.S. econ-
omy and over some of the most important, per-
sonal, and private decisions that Americans
make, while setting the stage for the eventual
evolution into a single-payer system.
Given the problems facing our health care
system—high costs, uneven quality, millions of
Americans without health insurance—it some-
times seems that things couldn’t possibly get
any worse. But if the final health care reform
plan contains most or all of these bad ideas,
things could indeed get worse—much worse. 
For the economy, Obamacare could mean
trillions of dollars in new taxes and the loss of
hundreds of thousands of jobs. Health care
providers could find their ability to practice
medicine constrained and directed by far away
government bureaucracies. But for individual
health care consumers the consequences
could be far worse: they would face far fewer
choices and the possibility of far poorer care. 
Health care clearly needs reform—but get-
ting that reform right is more important
than just doing something.153 Obamacare,
unless it is drastically revised in the coming
months, gets that reform wrong. 
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